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Offensive System Analysis



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Offensive System Analysis

Just my take: Joe is one of the recognized experts among the Redskins online commmunity. However, personally, I would not characterize our offense as being a "West Coast offense" in the tradition of Cincy (no longer), SF, GB, KC, Philadelphia, etc., although it is of course related, as a timed offense. Whether it is or not may be just a matter of semantics, since what Joe writes is substantively true, in my opinion. I may be wrong in this characterization, so please do not hesitate to correct me.
-Chris Suh


As the SF 49er's and Dallas Cowboys have enjoyed a great deal of success the past year, large numbers of former SF and Dallas offensive assistants (Holmgren, Shanahan, Rhodes, Turner, Wannstedt) have taken head coaching jobs and have brought copies of their respective offenses with them. Both SF and Dallas run what is commonly referred to as the "West Coast Offense" which actually has its' roots in the San Diego air game under Don Coryell and Ernie Zampese (with Joe Gibbs as an assistant).

Norv Turner's version of this offense is a combination of the lessons he learned as an assistant with John Robinson at USC and the Rams ("Student body left, student body right" fame), Ernie Zampese (who was then at the Rams), and Jimmy Johnson. From Robinson he learned the value of a hulking offensive line and pulling weakside-lineman to kill people at the point of attack (remember Ray Brown pulling from the LG spot to lead Terry Allen this past year?). With the Rams, he was a WR coach and became exposed to Zampese's system of timing routes. Having a former QB and QB coach tutor WRs under this offense isn't as strange as it seems because with this offense, WRs need to treat the game like QBs, they need to read defenses and adjust patterns.

Under Johnson, he learned the value of speed, using the offense to create big plays, and had the opportunity to take personal responsibility for the development of Troy Aikman.

The "West Coast" or "Timing Offense" as run by Norv Turner operates under several basic assumptions.

(1) Run precision patterns. The QB should be able to complete passes with his eyes closed because the WR's should be running exact patterns EVERYTIME--no deviation. A receiver should run a particular pattern (say, a sideline) the exact same distance each time, the cut should occur at the same place, and it should take exactly the same amount of time to run it each time.

(2) Put maximum people into the pass pattern. Rather than hold back a TE and RBs to pass block, the offense will often put all 5 eligible receivers past the line of scrimmage. Obviously, this means you only have 5 people pass blocking. This also means your FB must be a superb pass catcher and your TB should be good as well. If your TEs are role players, then you need a fast, big TE who can get downfield quickly with great hands (Asher) and a third down back who can make plays. Consequently, when this offense is done well, it is counterproductive to doubleteam Jerry Rice, Michael Irvin, or Henry Ellard because you' ll get killed by the other targets. This is in contrast to the Gibbs one-back offense where some teams (like the Giants under Bill Parcells) would simply refuse to cover the TE (Don Warren).

(3) Execute quickly. The longer the QB holds on to the ball, the more trouble he's likely to get into. This offense penalizes indecision or slow reads by the QB. When it is executed quickly, the QB is usually taking the snap, making final reads, evaluating and deciding among progressions, setting up, and releasing within 3.3 seconds if not sooner (in the first half of the first Skins-Eagles game in "95, Rodney Peete was averaging 2.7 seconds from snap to release). That is why mobile QBs like Elway, Montana, Young, Aikman are extremely valuable in this offense because they can often buy another second through athletic skills or "pocket sense" (remember the last play of the Denver-Washington game? Elway stepped up in the pocket and that time allowed the receiver to get to the goal line). One of the ways this offense completes longer pass patterns is, rather than having the QB wait in the pocket (with only 5 blockers), use pump fakes to freeze the safeties or CB and then release the ball sooner and higher and let the receiver run past coverage and under the ball. To put it another way, unless a defender falls down or there is a blown coverage, most deep patterns involve the QB throwing the ball before the deep receiver is open (or in some cases before they've even reached the last zone defender).

(4) Execute precisely. Just as WRs are expected to run precise routes that don't deviate, the mechanics (taking the snap, dropping back, setting up, reading the correct order of progressions) of the QB are key factors in the success of this offense (which is why young QBs often stumble with this offense initially). This also means that the QB must be extremely consistent with their mechanics (much like the receivers with their patterns). With this offense, the QB is expected to take a 3-step, 5-step, or 7-step drop.

The drops must be consistent (a drop that is too deep--even if it is 7 steps--means the ROT may set up too short and make it easier for a speed rusher to turn the corner and get to the QB). A drop that is too short may allow a bull-rushing DT to collapse the pocket on the QB. Sometimes, there are passing lanes built into the pass pocket--poor mechanics means that the QB is out of the lane or sets up after the passing lane has closed. Also, passing routes are designed so that each receiver gets "open" at a different time. Thus, in theory there could be 5 receivers who are all open on the same play but none of them open simultaneously. Thus, reading the receivers in the correct order is vital.

(5) Pre-snap reads are vital. Almost every play involves motion. Unlike Gibb's offense (which used motion to disquise plays or hide the true formation), Turner's offense uses motion to give the QB a chance to read the defense prior to the snap. Thus, the QB should have a pretty good idea of what the defense is going to do based upon their reaction to the motion prior to the snap. This helps the execution and insures the pass gets off quickly.

This also means the QB needs to get the team up to the line of scrimmage quickly so there is plenty of time to read the reaction to the motion man AND audible if necessary.

(6) Throw to the open-man. Because this offense puts a premium on putting recievers into the pattern, there should always be someone open. Forcing the ball (throwing into coverage) in this offense destroys the offensive scheme.

Not only does it tend to result in turnovers, but the receivers in the later progressions (often the TE and RBs) are less likely to runout their patterns.

The quickest way for a QB to get pulled from the starting position is for them to start forcing the ball--this is what cost Frerotte the starting job late this season--he insisted upon forcing the ball into coverage rather than throwing underneath or to uncovered receivers.

(7) Throw before the cut. Receivers are not only expected to run precise patterns, but they are expected to make sharp, distinct cuts (rather than round off their turns). This offense assumes that even a well-covered receiver (in man-to-man coverage) will be open for the first step or two after he makes his cut because the CB will have to react to the cut and recover. Thus, in man-to-man coverage, the QB throws the ball BEFORE the cut (when the receiver may appear to be covered) and uses the cut to "free the receiver". Again, precision and timing are vital issues here.

(8) Overwhelm the defense at the point of attack. Have a big OL. Then pull a TE and a G. Use the FB to seal pursuit (although sometimes the FB and TE will exchange roles just to screw up the defensive keys).. And develop the play quickly--don't give the defense time to recover or compensate with pursuit (against the Cowboys in the first Dallas game, the Skins never blocked Charles Haley on any running plays to the right side or over the Skin's left guard. Haley spent the game trying to run down the line of scrimmage or pursue Terry Allen from the backside--futilely). One exception--use the FB only for quick hits up the gut (with no lead blocking) or quick developing mis-direction plays--such calls aren't aimed at getting big yardage but at discouraging the defense from keying on the LG or TE to figure out where the play is going.

(9) Run outside only with speed and misdirection. The Skin's ground game isn't designed to go outside. This is very similar to Gibbs' approach to the running game. First of all, the backs don't have great speed. Second (and more importantly) the OL doesn't have the speed to beat most defenses outside. Third, Turner learned in Dallas from Emmitt Smith that the fastest way to run to the goal line is straight ahead. The Skins run outside to keep teams from bunching up inside.. So, they use their WRs (Sheppard, Westbrook) who have great speed on reverses (which involve misdirection--the Skins show action to the other side of the field or up the gut and then give the ball to the receiver on the reverse). In fact, one of the reasons the Skins have been so successful with reverses this past year is that teams have tended to counter the Skin's running attack between the tackles by having the DEs and LBs pursue down the line of scrimmage--this makes them vulnerable on the outside--especially when the DE initially gets a whiff of Terry Allen up the gut and then Westbrook takes the ball outside. The Skin's philosophy with such plays is that they're primarily run to set up other plays and to keep the defense from overplaying so if a reverse leads to big yardage, that is icing on the cake.

So, given these assumptions, how does the Skin's offense work (in theory if not always in practice)?

First, Norv Turner will compensate tremendously for his young QBs (and other players who are still growing). He'll line up 2 TEs to help out a young OLT like Joe Patton or he'll keep RBs in to pass block, knowing that his young QBs will rarely get to the 4th or 5th progression on pass plays. Consequently, the offensive scheme will sometimes look like "Dallas-lite" because he won't ask his QBs to do what they can't do yet. He'll run simple plays or even have patterns run that are short of a first down so the receiver has to make additional yardage after the catch for the first down rather than ask his young QB to "make a play" by possibly throwing into coverage.

However, given these limitations, the Skins will typically line up with a TE, 2 receivers and 2 backs. The receivers may be split (standard look) or they may start out with both receivers on the same side of the field, check defensive alignment and then move. One of the receivers will always go in motion (to give the QB a pre-snap read). After that, usually the TE or a back will go in motion to set up the real formation.

The number of steps that the QB takes on his drop dictates much of what can potentially happen on any pass play. For instance, the number of steps in the drop dictates the pass blocking, how quickly the play develops, the length of the patterns, and how much time before the QB gets killed. The patterns and circumstances under which they are successful vary significantly based upon the number of steps the QB takes in his drop. And each play will specificially dictate whether the QB takes a 3-step drop, 5-step drop or 7-step drop.

A 3-step drop pass play happens in several situations: (a) a short pass designed to pick up minimal yardage (either to get the first down or to force the CB to come up and play closer, setting up a deeper route later on) (b) a slant or inside route (one of the the basic building blocks of this offensive scheme. Being proficient at short inside slants means you get the ball off before blitzers can get to you and it forces the safeties up closer which then gives you lots of deep patterns. Denver tried to stop the 49er's slant routes by bringing up their safeties in the Superbowl and Jerry Rice broke all of Ricky Sander's Superbowl records. A team in this offense that is consistent on these routes sets up the defense for all sorts of other killer plays. A team that can't consistently complete these routes can't run this offense successfully), or (c) a quick developing route (like a designed screen where the RB is the first progression--very rare in this offense) because the QB has a very clear read that the defense is coming with extra pressure and it is clear that either the flat (ie: a RB on the screen) is uncovered or a CB at the line of scrimmage has no deep help and the QB is going to try to throw over him to a bigger receiver (particularly in the Red Zone). With a 3-step drop, the QB almost always is throwing to the first progression, no deeper than the second progression because unless the ball is off quickly, the pocket will be pushed into his face. Additionally, with a 3-step drop, the QB really can't step forward so deeper balls will tend to "hang up" in the air.

5-step drops are probably the most frequent drops for Skin's QBs in this offense. With a 5-step drop, speed rushing DE's who get around the OT outside face an incredible corner in order to still get to the QB. The key to getting legitimate pressure on a QB on a 5-step drop is to: (a) have the DE beat the OT with an inside move, (b) send blitzers through the gaps, or (c) if the QB takes too much time. The next time you see Frerotte or Shuler take a sack on a 5-step drop, if (a) or (b) didn't happen you can guarantee that their timing was off and they took too long on their reads. With a 5-step drop, the QB will have multiple receiver options--far more than with a 3-step drop (where they are usually no more than 2 options). In this offense, they are called "progressions". The QB will be expected to do a pre-snap read (usually by watching 2-3 defenders and how they react during the motion prior to the snap) then verify the read as he drops back and then based upon his read, follow the progressions. The read is important because (a) the progression order changes based upon his read and (b) the patterns change based upon the read (ie: the receiver's pattern varies based upon the defense they see at the snap. So any play that has 5 receivers going into the pattern may have as many as 18 potential patterns on that one play and what patterns the receivers run will depend upon the coverage shown).

Once the receivers and QB have a read of the coverage scheme, the progressions become an issue. The QB not only has to follow the progressions in order, he can't stick with a particular progression too long. This is because the routes are set up so receivers don't get open simultaneously but are staggered throughout the play. Thus, the SE may run a 7 yard slant (open quickly if the weakside LB is blitzing or dropping deep into zone coverage), the flanker is running a 14 yard sideline on the short side of the field (because the sideline is a longer throw and the field is shorter--ie: less sideline, the throw will need to be made quicker and probably before the WR makes the cut) might be the second progression, the TB may flair out into the right slot (freezing the strong side LB unless he drops back into zone to help out on the flanker, then the TB will be open) would be the third progression, the TE (who went in motion to the weak side of the formation) runs a 3-5 yard out (into space cleared out by the SE) might be the fourth progression, the SE who has now continued his slant across the field and is 25 yards downfield becomes the 5th progression (if the flanker drew the safety up on the sideline, the SE will be in man-to-man coverage with no-one between him and the endzone). The FB fakes a carry into the line (to try and freeze the LBs and SS) and then runs a 5-8 yard hook over the right side to keep the MLB and safeties from providing deep or outside help--he'd be the 6th progression. Notice how the order of the progressions is important. If you look to the FB first, he'll never be open because he'll still be fighting his way past the line of scrimmage (and the DL will grab at him or any other receiver within reach to slow them up). If he looks at the flanker too late, he will have run out of field on the sideline. If the SE (the first progression) is covered on the slant than the TE (the 4th progession) will probably be open as the CB followed the SE and the LB didn't get out wide into coverage. But if the CB played zone (so the TE is covered) than as the SE continues the slant deeper, he'll be open (as the 5th progression) as the safety reacts to the flanker on the sideline (the second progression). Get the progressions out of order and the play has no order. Keep them in sequence and you start messing with the defense's head--you show them movement, they react logically and then get burned. Everything the defense does seems to only make matters worse.

Montana would routinely take plays with 5-step drops to 5 progressions. To do so in this offense on a consistent basis requires (a) incredibly quick reads and (b) a QB with excellent feet and pocket sense who can buy .5 seconds by sidestepping a rusher or moving up in the pocket. In early "94, Shuler rarely got his progressions in order. For young QBs (either Frerotte or Shuler) to get past the first 2 progressions is pretty rare. One of the reasons Ellard catches so many third down passes is that he is usually the first or second progression on almost every 5-step drop sequence. In "95 (when Shuler started in the later third of the season), he showed tremendous improvement because so many of his passes were to the backs and TE--which on 5-step drops are almost always the third or fourth progression in this offense. This is a pretty clear indication that he was following his progressions and not just throwing to the first or second receiver.

7-step drops involve significantly more time and the angle the DE must take on outside rushes isn't as sharp (thus easier to get to the QB). Thus, pass protection is a bigger factor. 7-step drops are typically called on plays where Turner: (a) feels the rush will be easily contained--maybe because the defense will rush only 3 men or (b) an extra receiver will be held in to pass block (often makes sense with Shuler and Frerotte because you know they will rarely get to the 4th or 5th progression anyway so he'll use the TE or FB or TB as a pass blocker instead) or (c) the defensive tactics make a 7-step drop necessary (like the CBs are jamming the WRs on the line of scrimmage so it takes longer for the patterns to develop or the patterns that are open are deeper ones against a zone or receivers are running deeper patterns to stretch coverage for other receivers who will run patterns into the resulting gaps in the stretched coverage).

As for running plays, the Turner will call about 5-9 running plays a game that really aren't intended to gain yardage--they're intended to keep the defense honest so they can't overplay the Skins running package. The catch is that these plays have often proven to be big ones for the Skins BECAUSE teams compensated so much for the Skin's standard package that they became vulnerable to plays that should be easy to stop (shovel passes to Mitchell, reverses, etc.).

Carries to the FB usually involve traps or quick hitting plays with no additional blocking (besides straight ahead drive blocks). They are intended to punish a defense for keying on the TB or a pulling G or TE. Even if the FB gains no serious yardage, if the defense knows the FB will get the ball 3-5 times a game in such situations, it makes it difficult for the defense to react quickly to Terry Allen as he runs between the tackles. A half-a-second of hesitation as a DT verifies his key is all the difference a veteran like Gesek or Simmons needs to get enough of an angle on him to open a hole for Allen. Reverses are intended in much the same manner. Teams typically defense the Skin's ground game by putting extra men on the line of scrimmage, having the DE and OLBs pursue down the line of scrimmage and catch Allen from behind and using a safety to plug gaps in the middle. By using fast players (like Sheppard and Westbrook) and mis-direction (the reverse usually starts with a G pulling to one side and the TB following), the defense overpursues and leaves gaps outside. The reverse forces the defense to stay home. The DE and OLB can't get too far inside. The safeties are forced to stay back. Or the reverse becomes a very big play.

Additionally, with the Skin's running game, they'll rarely try to block everyone on the opposing front 7. Instead they'll seek to get overwhelming superiority at the point of attack (which lately has meant pulling LG Ray Brown and running between RG Tre Johnson and RT Ed Simmons). This tactic works if the TB gets to the line of scrimmage quickly instead of delaying in the backfield or hesitating before the line of scrimmage (a continual problem that Reggie Brooks has always had).

As simple as the Skins' running game appears (and it is simple), it works because Turner's tactics punish teams for responding to what he is doing. When they try to send the unblocked players (like the weakside DE) down the line of scrimmage in pursuit, Marc Logan will get a quick trap call over the left side or Westbrook will take a reverse over the weakside after a fake to Allen or the Skins will try a shovel pass to Mitchell. You can count on about 5-7 plays a game from the Skins that consist of reverses, FB traps or quick hits, or shovel passes and all of these are plays that are intended to either force the defense to play honest or to punish the defense for overplaying the inside running game to Terry Allen. These are all plays that are typically easy to stop IF your defense is staying at home, not gambling and not compensating.

This also means that the role of FB in this offense is particularly unique. The FB needs to be a good blocker (nothing special in that), a very gifted pass catcher who runs very good patterns (unique in a FB, most teams have used FBs as safety valve receivers and thrown to them behind the LOS or in the flat, not downfield) and the FB needs to have extremely good speed (or at minimum, excellent initial quickness). This is because carries to the FB are usually quick-developing plays with little counter action or delay and no lead blocking. The FB is expected to get to the hole quickly. The better speed and quickness the FB has, the more it forces the DL to stay home and respect the FB.

What is also especially powerful about this offensive scheme as devised by Turner is that when the players execute it well, plays develop so quickly that the defense begins to guess and attempts to anticipate. And Turner does a great job of punishing defenses that try to overplay the Skin's tendencies. This has the effect then of making defenders hesitate and play with doubt. At the point defenders are hesitating or second-guessing, the OL is able to seize control of the line-of-scrimmage and the defense appears to be a step behind in reacting to everything the Skins do. Some of the classic examples of what Turner is able to do with play selection and keeping defenses off-balance are the New Orleans game in "94, and both Dallas games in "95.

Joe Willmore